This paper examines the predictive power of shifts in monetary policy, as measured by changes in the real federal funds rate, for output, inflation, and survey expectations of these variables. We find that policy shifts have larger effects on actual output than on expected output; thus, policy predicts errors in output expectations, a violation of rational expectations. Policy shifts do not predict errors in inflation expectations. We explain these results with a model in which agents systematically underestimate the effects of policy on aggregate demand. This model helps to explain the real effects of policy.
We also examine the predictive power of policy shifts for inflation and for expectations of inflation. Here, we cannot reject rationality. A rise in the real funds rate leads to a fall in inflation at a horizon of 2 years, and a roughly equal fall in expected inflation. Thus, policy shifts do not predict errors in inflation expectations.
Our results add new evidence to the general debate about the rationality of expectations. Most important, we find that rationality fails in a particular direction, one that helps explain the effects of monetary policy. To make this point, we analyze a simple macroeconomic model with sticky prices. In the model, policy is neutral under rational expectations. We show, however, that policy is nonneutral if agents systematically underestimate the effects of policy on aggregate demand. Crucially, this assumption about expectations also produces results that match our empirical findings: policy shifts predict surprises in real output but not surprises in inflation. Thus, our empirical results support our explanation for nonneutrality.
The remainder of this paper contains four sections. Section 1 describes our empirical methodology, and Section 2 presents the results. Section 3 interprets the results using our model, and Section 4 concludes.
METHODOLOGY
We explore the predictive power of shifts in monetary policy for three output variables: actual output, survey expectations of output, and the difference between the two. We perform a similar procedure for inflation. Here, we describe the details of our approach.
The Basic Regressions
We measure output by real GNP (or GDP starting in 1992) and inflation by the GNP (GDP) deflator. For both variables, expectations are given by the mean forecast from the SPF. In an earlier version of this paper (Ball and Croushore 1995) , we also examined expectations from the Livingston survey of business economists and the Michigan survey of consumers. One might expect the behavior of expectations to vary across the surveys because of the different levels of sophistication of forecasters, general economists, and consumers. It turns out, however, that our results are similar for all three surveys.
In studying both actual and expected variables, we examine deviations from the forecasts of univariate statistical models, that is, we ask whether policy causes inflation and output to deviate from the paths that one would forecast based on their usual dynamics and whether survey respondents expect these deviations. Our univariate model for quarterly output growth is an AR(1) process with a mean that shifts in 1973:2. Our model for inflation is an IMA(1,1) process. Given these models, we compute statistical forecasts using rolling regressions.
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Letting y denote output, y e denote survey expectations of output, and y f denote statistical forecasts, we ask whether policy shifts predict y Ϫ y f and whether they predict y e Ϫ y f . We also examine the difference between these two variables to see whether policy shifts lead systematically to expectational errors. Note that this difference is simply y Ϫ y e and thus is not affected by our choice of statistical models. For inflation, we define π, π e , and π f similarly and examine the analogous combinations of variables.
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We measure policy shifts with changes in the real federal funds rate. This choice reflects the growing consensus among researchers that the real funds rate captures the stance of policy (e.g., Taylor 1993) . We define the real funds rate as the nominal rate minus the mean of expected inflation from the SPF.
Timing
Our data are quarterly. We examine overlapping observations of expected and actual variables over periods of 1 year. For an observation dated at quarter t, actual inflation is inflation from t to t ϩ 4. Our output variable is output growth from t to t ϩ 4. Expected inflation and growth from t to t ϩ 4 are reported by survey respondents during quarter t. Finally, our statistical forecasts of inflation and output growth are based on quarterly models estimated through t Ϫ 1 (the last quarter for which data are available during quarter t).
We measure changes in the broad stance of policy with changes in the real federal funds rate over periods of 1 year. For observation t, FF1 is the difference between the real funds rate in quarter t Ϫ 1 (the last quarter completed before expectations are formed) and the rate four quarters earlier, during t Ϫ 5. FF2 is the difference between the real funds rates at t Ϫ 5 and t Ϫ 9, and FF3 is the difference between funds rates at t Ϫ 9 and t Ϫ 13. These annual changes in the funds rate are the regressors in our equations for actual and expected inflation and output.
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Our data begin in 1968:4, the first quarter of the SPF, and end in 1995:2. Not surprisingly, FF1 has a negative and highly significant effect on y Ϫ y f , that is, output growth falls below the level predicted by a univariate forecast if the real federal funds rate rose in the previous year. When included, FF2 has a negative effect, with borderline significance (t ϭ 1.8). The sum of the coefficients on FF1 and FF2 is approximately Ϫ1.1, that is, a 1 percentage point rise in the real funds rate reduces output growth by 1.1% over 2 years.
RESULTS

Output: Basic Results
The FF variables also have negative effects on y e Ϫ y f : rises in the real funds rate lead survey respondents to expect lower output. However, the effects on expected output are smaller than the effects on actual output: the sum of the coefficients on FF1 and FF2 is about Ϫ0.5. The effects of the FF variables on y Ϫ y e , the expectational error, are the differences between their effects on actual and expected output. Thus, a one-point rise in the funds rate reduces y Ϫ y e by 1.1% Ϫ 0.5% ϭ 0.6%. These effects of the funds rate are highly significant (p-value Ͻ 0.01). 1971:2, 1975:3, and 1983:3 , which correspond to loosenings aimed at ending recessions. In all these episodes, y Ϫ y e moves sharply around the same time as FF1.
5
The significant effect of the FF variables on y Ϫ y e is a violation of rational expectations because survey respondents observe these variables when they form expectations. Rationality is rejected because respondents systematically underestimate the effects of policy shifts, both tightenings and easings. 
Output: Robustness
Here, we investigate the robustness of our findings by varying the specification in Table 1 . We focus on our central result that lagged changes in monetary policy predict the expectational error y Ϫ y e . A more general lag structure. We first generalize the lag structure in our regressions for y Ϫ y e . Rather than include FF1 and FF2, which are changes in the real funds rate over four-quarter periods, we enter quarterly changes in the rate from t Ϫ 1 through t Ϫ 9, that is, we allow each of the eight quarterly changes to have a different effect on y Ϫ y e . With this specification, the first five lags of the change in the funds rate have coefficients ranging from Ϫ0.4 to Ϫ0.6, and all are significant at the 5% level. The coefficients on longer lags are below 0.05 in absolute value and highly insignificant. The significance of the first five lags confirms our finding that policy shifts predict y Ϫ y e , although the timing is slightly different from before. Regime shifts. So far, we have treated the period from 1968 through 1995 as one monetary regime with a stable relationship between output and the federal funds rate. However, changes in the behavior of monetary policy could have caused this relationship to shift. To check this possibility, we examine the predictive power of our FF variables for y Ϫ y e in different subsamples. We break our sample at two points: 1979:4, when Paul Volcker announced his change in operating procedures, and 1986:1, when Taylor's (1993) interest-rate rule begins to fit the data. Table 2 presents regressions of y Ϫ y e on FF1 and FF2 for each of the three subsamples. The results for the first two periods are similar to those for the entire sample. The results for the post-1986 period are somewhat different: the sum of coefficients is close to that for the full sample, but it is FF2 rather than FF1 that is significantly negative. It appears that the lag between interest-rate changes and This finding does not, however, affect our central conclusions. In each of the three subsamples, the sum of coefficients on the two FF variables is significantly negative at the 5% level. Thus, our finding that rises in the funds rate lead to negative output surprises is robust, although the timing differs across periods.
Controlling for output innovations. FF1 and FF2 are endogenous variables: policymakers adjust the real interest rate in response to developments in the economy. A natural question to ask is whether the predictable movements in y Ϫ y e that we detect are caused by the FF variables themselves or by the variables to which the Fed is reacting-in particular, past output movements. 7 To address this question, we add lags of output innovations to the equation for y Ϫ y e and examine whether the FF variables are still significant. Specifically, we include the average values of the innovation in actual output, y Ϫ y f , over the periods from t Ϫ 5 to t Ϫ 1 and t Ϫ 9 to t Ϫ 5 (the periods used to measure FF1 and FF2).
The results of this exercise are anticlimactic. The effects of past output innovations on y Ϫ y e are highly insignificant. In addition, including these variables has little effect on the coefficients on FF1 and FF2: these are still jointly significant at the 1% level, with magnitudes close to those in Table 1 ( Ϫ0.43 and Ϫ0.22) .
Changes in the nominal federal funds rate. So far, we have measured the stance of monetary policy with the real federal funds rate. However, the variable that the Fed controls directly is the nominal funds rate. In principle, the movements in real rates that predict y Ϫ y e might come from shifts in expected inflation rather than decisions by the Fed to shift the nominal rate. Therefore, as a final robustness check, we regress y Ϫ y e on lagged changes in nominal rather than real rates. Specifically, we construct nominal versions of the FF variables in our basic regressions. FF1 becomes the change in the nominal funds rate from t Ϫ 5 to t Ϫ 1, and FF2 is the nominal change from t Ϫ 9 to t Ϫ 5. When y Ϫ y e is regressed on these variables, the coefficients are Ϫ0.40 for FF1 and Ϫ0.10 for FF2. These coefficients are close to those for the real versions of FF1 and FF2, and they are jointly significant at the 1% level. Thus, our conclusions again appear robust. 
Inflation
We now turn to our inflation variables π Ϫ π f , π e Ϫ π f , and π Ϫ π e . Table 3 reports regressions of these variables on various combinations of FF1, FF2, and FF3, defined again as the changes in the real federal funds rate from t Ϫ 5 to t Ϫ 1, t Ϫ 9 to t Ϫ 5, and t Ϫ 13 to t Ϫ 9.
In the π Ϫ π f equations, FF1 has an insignificant coefficient and FF2 and FF3 have significantly negative coefficients, that is, a policy tightening reduces actual inflation with a 2-to 3-year lag, compared with a 1-year lag for its effects on output. These results confirm previous findings about lags in the effects of policy (e.g., Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992) .
The effects of policy on expected inflation are similar to the effects on actual inflation: in the equation for π e Ϫ π f , FF1 has an insignificant coefficient and FF2 As with our output regressions, we have varied our inflation equation in a number of ways and generally find that our conclusions are robust.
INTERPRETATION
Background
The behavior of expectations is crucial to the effects of monetary policy on real output. Recent research suggests that these effects are difficult to explain under the assumption of rational expectations, even when using models with frictions in wage and price setting. In particular, models of staggered price adjustment such as Taylor (1979) do not capture the inertia that makes it costly to reduce inflation. With rational expectations, tight monetary policy can reduce inflation in these models without any loss of output (Ball, 1991, Fuhrer and Moore, 1995) . This result conflicts with the empirical evidence that disinflations almost always cause recessions (e.g., Ball 1994) .
It is easier to explain the effects of monetary policy if expectations are less than fully rational (e.g., Roberts 1997) . Motivated by this idea, a large literature has tested the rationality of expectations in surveys such as the SPF. The results are mixed, and authors who survey the literature differ in their interpretations of the evidence (e.g., Lovell, 1986 , Roberts, 1997 , Croushore, 1998 . Our results concerning output expectations are a new piece of negative evidence for the validity of rational expectations.
Most important, we determine a particular direction in which rationality fails: output expectations underreact to shifts in monetary policy. This particular failure of rationality helps explain why policy is nonneutral. To demonstrate this point, the rest of this section analyzes a simple macroeconomic model with sticky prices. In this model, policy is neutral under rational expectations but nonneutral if agents underestimate the effects of policy on aggregate demand. With this deviation from rationality, the model also fits our empirical results: policy shifts predict errors in output expectations but not in inflation expectations.
Assumptions
We consider an economy with an aggregate-demand curve-a negative relation between the price level and aggregate spending:
where y is real output, p is the price level, and x is a term capturing shifts in demand (all variables are in logs). The shift term x is determined by lagged monetary policy:
where q Ϫ1 measures the stance of monetary policy in the previous period. In comparing our empirical results with the model, we interpret a rise in the real federal funds rate as a fall in q. For simplicity, we ignore nonmonetary shocks that shift aggregate demand. The supply side of the economy is given by a simple sticky-price model. A firm's desired nominal price, p*, is given by
which follows from the canonical macroeconomic model with monopolistic competition. Intuitively, an increase in aggregate spending shifts out a firm's demand curve, raising its desired relative price (see Romer, 1996, chapter 6) . A firm must set its price one period in advance. It chooses a price equal to its expected optimal price, p e ϩ vy e , where superscript e denotes expectations in the previous period. All firms are identical, so this expression gives the aggregate price level as well as individual prices:
Most authors who study models such as ours assume rational expectations (see Romer, 1996 , for example). We are interested, however, in the idea that agents underestimate the effects of policy shifts on aggregate demand. A simple version of this behavior is static expectations about the demand-shifter x: x e ϭ x Ϫ1 . Under this assumption, price setters believe that demand is the same as that in the previous period. Since x ϭ q Ϫ1 , this is equivalent to believing that q Ϫ1 equals q Ϫ2 : price setters ignore the most recent shift in policy. Our assumption of static demand expectations is, of course, extreme; future work could consider cases in which expectations react partially to policy shifts.
Aside from ignoring the most recent policy shift, firms behave rationally. In particular, they form rational expectations of p and y, conditional on their beliefs about x and the knowledge that other firms have the same beliefs.
The Effects of Policy
We now examine the effects of policy in our model. We assume that the policy stance q shifts over time and derive the behavior of actual and expected inflation and output. The nature of the process driving q is not important for our purposes.
As a benchmark, we first consider the case in which expectations are fully rational. In our model, current variables are determined entirely by q Ϫ1 , which is known when prices are set. Thus, rational expectations are equivalent to perfect foresight: p e ϭ p and y e ϭ y. Substituting these results into Equations (1) and (4) yields y ϭ 0 and p ϭ x/s ϭ q Ϫ1 /s. Note that output is not affected by the path of policy.
We now assume static expectations about x: x e ϭ x Ϫ1 . Taking expectations of Equation (1) 
With static demand expectations, a shift in the policy stance affects actual output: y depends on q Ϫ1 Ϫ q Ϫ2 . In addition, Equations (5) and (6) match our empirical findings about expectations: a policy loosening leads to a positive output surprise, but it does not cause an inflation surprise. Thus, our model produces an explanation for monetary nonneutrality, and the model's empirical predictions are supported by the data.
Equations (5) and (6) reflect the assumption that prices are set before demand is determined. A change in demand, which is a surprise under static expectations, produces a contemporaneous surprise in output. In contrast, prices adjust to demand with a lag. Thus, price changes are anticipated even if agents ignore the current shift in demand.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents new evidence against the rational expectations hypothesis: shifts in the real federal funds rate predict errors in output expectations in the SPF. We explain our results with a model in which agents systematically underestimate the effects of policy shifts on aggregate demand. This deviation from rationality helps explain the real effects of monetary policy.
Why are expectations less than fully rational? One possibility is that agents form expectations using rules of thumb to reduce the costs of gathering and processing information (Ball, 1991 , Roberts, 1997 . This may not, however, be a good explanation for the professional forecasters in the SPF, who have strong incentives to optimize fully. Lamont (1995) suggests that forecasters violate rationality because they have objectives other than minimizing forecast errors, such as building their reputations. But similar violations of rationality occur in surveys of consumers, who do not have such objectives (Ball and Croushore 1995) . Explaining the behavior of expectations is a crucial open area for research. NOTES 1. Our choices of statistical models are based on previous work and our own diagnostic tests. Our choice of an inflation process is based on Barsky (1987) and Ball and Cecchetti (1990) . Our choice of an AR(1) process for output growth is based on Beveridge and Nelson (1981) and Campbell and Mankiw (1987) ; Perron (1989) proposes a shift in the mean in 1973:2. For both output and inflation, our ARIMA models are the smallest ones that pass tests for autocorrelation (the Durbin-Watson and Q tests) and the tests on forecast residuals suggested by Diebold and Lopez (1996) .
2. Expected output growth is calculated using the mean forecast for the level of output four quarters ahead and the mean forecast for the current quarter. Similarly, expected inflation is constructed from forecasts of the GNP deflator four quarters ahead and in the current quarter. Actual output growth and inflation are calculated from the data available 3 months after the end of each quarter; this avoids problems arising from rebenchmarking of data and changing base years. (The results are similar, however, if we use final revised data.) For further details about the SPF see Croushore (1993) .
3. The nominal federal funds rate is the quarterly average of the daily rate. Note that the data on current inflation expectations are published near the midpoint of each quarter. Therefore, π e at t Ϫ 1 and, hence, the real funds rate at t Ϫ 1 are known when agents form expectations at t.
4. Note that in Table 1 , each coefficient in the equation for y Ϫ y e is exactly the difference of the corresponding coefficients in the equations for y Ϫ y f and y e Ϫ y f . This fact follows algebraically from the properties of OLS.
5. See Romer and Romer (1989, 1994) for discussions of Federal Reserve policy during the 1970s and 1980s.
6. Some tests of rational expectations require microdata on the expectations of individual forecasters. Tests based on the mean forecast can be biased if different individuals have different information (Keane and Runkle 1990) . However, the particular tests that we perform with mean forecasts are valid. The reason is that we examine the predictive power of aggregate variables, FF1 and FF2, that are observed by all individuals (see Note 3). Since everyone observes FF1 and FF2, rationality implies that these variables are uncorrelated with each individual's expectational error. Averaging across individuals, FF1 and FF2 must be uncorrelated with the mean expectational error under rationality.
7. We thank one of our referees for suggesting that we answer this question. 8. We have also experimented with real FF variables based on alternative measures of expected inflation, such as Livingston expectations over short horizons and lags of actual inflation. The results are always similar to those in Table 1. 9. The SPF provides expectations of nominal income as well as output and inflation. When we regress errors in nominal income expectations on the FF variables, the coefficients are negative; when FF1, FF2, and FF3 are included, the sum of the coefficients is Ϫ0.48. The negative nominal income surprise after a tightening is consistent with the negative surprise in real output and near-zero surprise in inflation. However, the standard errors in our nominal income equations are large, and so the effects of the FF variables on nominal income surprises are not statistically significant.
10. Most previous papers that test rationality focus on expectations of inflation. Only a few examine output expectations, and most of these yield inconclusive results because the sample periods are short. Mild evidence against rationality is reported by Zarnowitz (1985) , Swidler and Ketcher (1990) , and Batchelor and Dua (1991) .
11. These derivations use our assumption that price setters form rational expectations conditional on their beliefs about demand. After setting x e ϭ x Ϫ1 , we derive the behavior of y and p through standard rational-expectations arguments.
